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The summer of 2013 was a historic moment for Somalis in the UK, as many took part 
in what turned out to be an unprecedented and unexpected wave of political 
mobilization. Images of the Somali community protesting against Barclays Bank 
spread rapidly across news outlets and social media. The demonstrations emerged in 
response to Barclays’ decision to shut down the accounts of 250 money transfer 
operators (MTOs). Among the accounts due for closure were four Somali MTOs 
operating in the UK, including Dahabshiil, the largest in the Somali remittance market 
and a major player in the economy of the Somali territories. Although the closures 
impacted on many other remittance companies, affecting Polish, Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani migrant groups, Somalis were among the most vocal and visible in 
conveying their discontent. Somali diaspora groups, remittance companies, NGOs, 
and politicians joined forces to mount a campaign against Barclays – the last bank in 
the UK to offer accounts to MTOs – and to push the UK government to find a durable 
solution to the issue. 
 
The announced closures did not come as a surprise. Al Barakaat, another Somali 
remittance company, had its accounts shut and assets frozen by the US in 2001, and 
accused of having links with a Somali Islamist group (Horst and Van Hear 2002). As 
with the Barclays Bank closures, the incident brought to the fore ambivalent attitudes 
towards the Somali diaspora, as simultaneously ‘peace-wreckers’ and ‘peace-makers’ 
(Smith and Stares 2007). Anna Lindley (2009) has described how, following the Al 
Barakaat closures, the international community cast the Somali money transfer 
infrastructures as both ‘dirty money’ and ‘development capital’. On the one hand the 
closures were a result of the post 9/11 geopolitical context, which has led to tighter 
regulation around the prevention of the financing of terrorist activities. On the other 
hand, following the closures, UN agencies, and aid organizations put in place a 
‘humanitarian defence’, highlighting the importance of the remittance ‘lifeline’ in 
war-torn Somalia, and emphasizing the potential ‘development capital’ of the 
remittance industry.  
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Just over a decade later, in May 2013, Somalis in the UK built on the ‘humanitarian 
defence’ to initiate a campaign that stressed their role as a ‘good diaspora.’ They 
requested that the government protect their ‘lifeline’ by supporting the Somali 
remittance infrastructure, which, they claimed, enabled the diaspora to send money 
home cheaply and efficiently. They asked not to be demonized as suspected 
‘terrorists’, but to be recognized as transnational development actors supporting 
families and communities back home. The campaigners also requested, at a later stage 
in the campaign, to be included as stakeholders in government initiatives, and hence 
to be recognized as a professional, politically active, and integrated community in the 
UK. 
 
Their mobilization resulted in Barclays delaying the date for closure several times, 
and in persuading the UK government – which initially ignored their demands 
claiming it could not interfere in a commercial decision – to set up an Action Group 
for Cross-border remittances. Part of the Action group included a Safer Corridor Pilot 
for UK-Somali remittances, led by the Department for International Development 
(DfID), with support from the Treasury and an Advisory Group, and a technical 
implementation group led by the World Bank. After some discussion, three Somali 
‘community representatives’ and the chairman of the Somali Remittance Association 
SOMSA were included as stakeholders in the Advisory Group.  
 
The campaign was an important moment for Somalis in the UK, marking the 
emergence of heightened and effective forms of political mobilization. A decade 
previously, Somalis had been described as an ‘invisible community’ (Harris 2004), 
and presented in the academic literature as exhibiting low levels of collective 
mobilization and political visibility (Griffiths 2000, Hopkins 2006). The scale of 
involvement, in terms of numbers and levels of commitment in the 2013 campaign, 
however, proved otherwise. Organized by a number of youth groups, the campaign 
benefited from the skills and networks of groups which had gained prominence thanks 
also to their close alliances with government, local politicians, NGOs and academics. 
Furthermore, the campaign signalled a change in the nature and scale of the demands 
made. While previous demands made to the state by Somali community 
representatives or activists had been primarily aimed at resolving local issues around 
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service provision or representation, the campaign requested that the government 
support the diaspora as both national and transnational actors involved in issues that 
tied the UK to the Somali regions. It thus required a larger and cross-departmental 
response from the government. 
 
This article focuses on the mobilizing practices and activities around the closures of 
the Barclays accounts, to explore the interrelated questions of how and to what effect 
young Somali ‘political entrepreneurs’ (Adamson 2012) mobilized around the 
remittance account closures in the UK. It draws on qualitative research conducted 
with the Somali diaspora in the UK between April and December 2014 as part of a 
larger project on ‘Diaspora Engagement in War-Torn Countries’, which is part of the 
Oxford Diaspora Programme. Led by Nicholas Van Hear, the project analyses 
diaspora engagement around three spheres: the sphere of the ‘household’ and the 
extended family, which is largely private and personal; the more public sphere of the 
‘known community’, by which is meant collectivities of people that know each other 
or know of each other; and the largely public sphere of the ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson 1983), including ethnic, national, religious and other allegiances and 
affinities. In a joint article which emerged from this project, Van Hear and Cohen 
(2016) explore the forms of engagement across these three spheres by comparing the 
experiences of distant and contiguous diasporas which emerge in conditions of 
conflict. They argue that the disaggregation of these three spheres of engagement can 
help unravel the discrepancies between those in the diaspora and at home, and to 
further analyse the diaspora’s capacity and desire to engage (Al-Ali et al. 2001). 
 
The remittance campaign, which I analyse in what follows, engages all three ‘spheres’ 
of engagement. Barclays’ decision to close the accounts posed a threat to the 
remittance channels used by Somalis to send money abroad, impacting on their 
engagement at the ‘household’ level, while much of the collective organizing 
unfolded at the level of the ‘known community’. Both these spheres, however, 
shaped, and were shaped by, an ‘imagined community’ based around generation, pan-
Somali unity and ideas of ‘professionalism’ (Hansen 2013) drawn from national 
discourses on multiculturalism and notions of diaspora and development. 
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This article focuses on how this ‘imagined community’ took shape throughout the 
campaign. It adopts an approach that treats ‘diaspora’ not as agents but as co-
produced by policy makers, international organizations and NGOs through an 
ensemble of institutions, procedures, discourses and tactics, as well as by migrants 
themselves who make themselves into diasporic subjects (Axel 2004, Adamson 2012, 
Sokefeld 2006, Kleist 2008, Horst 2013). Specifically, drawing on Adamson’s work 
on political mobilization (2012: 25-26), this article engages with diaspora as a specific 
form of transnationalism, and ‘as the products or outcomes of transnational 
mobilization activities by political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity 
construction.’ One of the unique features of ‘diasporic politics’, Adamson argues, is 
the attempt by political entrepreneurs ‘to reify and reproduce in a transnational and 
politicized form a particular identity category’ (ibid 2012: 26), or particular forms of 
‘imagined communities.’  
 
Rather than focusing on the Somali diaspora as agents, I explore how the campaign, 
through its mobilizing practices and framing devises produced a particular ‘imagined 
community’ (Sokefeld 2006, Adamson 2012), which in turn shaped activities at the 
‘known community’ and ‘household’ spheres. While most of the literature on 
diaspora has explored ‘imagined communities’ in relation to ethno-national groups 
and particularist claims, I focus here on unpacking the generational dimensions of this 
‘imagined community’ that emerged in the campaign. I also bring to the fore how 
young Somalis managed, negotiated, and challenged local, national, and transnational 
discourses about diaspora and about migrant ethnic and community groups in Britain. 
I argue that the campaign produced particular imagined notions of Somalis as a ‘good 
diaspora’ community – as small-scale humanitarian actors, and as unified, impartial 
and ‘professional’ community representatives.1 It challenged mainstream views of 
Somalis as a ‘problem’ community, and presented young Somalis as new political 
actors in the UK and the Somali regions. 
 
These notions of ‘good diaspora’, which I analyse throughout, are shaped both by 
discourses and forms of governance around migration in Britain, as well as by 
                                                 
1 The focus is on the normative construction of ‘good diaspora’ through the campaign, and hence the 
term is used to refer to an idealised construction of what a diaspora in Britain should do. 
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transnational discourses on development and professionalism. This article, therefore, 
brings together the literature on diaspora political mobilization and transnational 
engagement, which has focused on diaspora formation and engagement back home 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Sokefeld 2006; Turner and Kleist 2013; Sinatti and Horst 
2014; Van Hear and Cohen 2016), with that on political mobilization among migrant 
groups, which has focused on the host country (Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008; 
Però and Solomos 2010; Però 2008; Riccio and Russo 2011; Statham 1999; 
Koopmans 2004).2 By prioritizing the ‘discursive elements’ of political opportunity 
(Koopmans 2004: 451), it shows how young Somalis reify, merge, and challenge 
categories of diaspora, ethnic community, and migrant, which have tended to be kept 
analytically separate in the literature. 
 
Ethnographic research was conducted throughout the campaign in 2013 and 2014. It 
involved participating in meetings and informal gatherings, observing online 
discussions and reporting on the campaign, and conducting over 30 semi-structured 
interviews with Somali diaspora groups, NGO workers, government officials, 
journalists and scholars involved in the campaign in the UK.  Interviews were carried 
out between April and December 2014, and questions posed focused on involvement 
in the campaign, motivations, perspectives on the aims and outcomes, obstacles and 
tensions, and general background information on the interviewee. Additional research 
was carried out in Hargeysa, Somaliland involving 32 interviews with policymakers, 
politicians, directors of remittance companies (xawilaad), NGOs and other civil 
society groups. The research was facilitated by long-term ethnographic research 
conducted with Somalis in the UK between 2009 and 2011 (Liberatore 2017).  
 
In what follows I account for the recent emergence of Somali youth groups in London 
– the main protagonists of the campaign – in the broader context of national and 
international efforts to engage the Somali diaspora. The subsequent section returns to 
the campaign to elucidate how the activists presented themselves through notions of 
diaspora engagement, ethnic community, and professionalism, while employing these 
strategically throughout the campaign.  The final section focuses on a contentious 
                                                 
2 This literature has tended to expand on the political opportunity structure approach pioneered by 
Ireland (1994). 
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issue that emerged between activists and government officials, namely the place 
within the campaign of Dahabshiil, the largest Somali remittance company in the UK. 
The issue brought to the fore some of boundaries and limitations of the ‘good 
diaspora’ identity category. 
 
ENGAGING THE SOMALI DIASPORA IN THE UK 
 
Refugee migration to Britain: Somalis as a problem community 
 
The UK hosts the largest and most established Somali community in Europe, with 
around 100,000 people of Somali origins residing in the country (Census 2011). 
Compared with Somalis in places such as the UAE or South Africa (Abdi 2015), 
Somalis in the UK tend to have a more secure immigration status, and are entitled to 
welfare support. In recent years many Somalis with EU passports have begun to move 
from other European countries to settle in the UK. 
The largest influx of Somalis occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s as civil 
war spread across the Somali regions. Most of the ‘first generations’ arrived 
throughout the 1988-1991 from the north-western areas (present day Somaliland), and 
subsequently from southern areas following state collapse in 1990. Most were granted 
refugee and later citizenship status. With the rolling back of the state in 1990s Britain, 
responsibility for welfare shifted towards local NGOs and civil society organizations, 
including refugee community organizations (Però and Solomon 2010: 5). Within the 
multicultural paradigm, migrants and minorities were encouraged to organize around  
‘unified and readily identifiable refugee communities’ based around ethnicity 
(Griffiths et al 2006: 892). They formed local community or voluntary organizations 
‘in exchange for resources and recognition from the state (national and local) that saw 
them as governmental tools for social cohesion and status quo maintenance’ (Però and 
Solomon 2010: 5). Somali community organizations were set up to support newly 
arrived refugees with resettlement and integration processes, but often struggled in the 
absence of adequate funding and competition over resources (Hopkins 2006). 
 
Writing over a decade ago, Hopkins (2006) notes that, despite the presence of a large 
number of Somali community organizations in the UK, which provide a range of 
services from assistance with housing, unemployment, language lessons and legal 
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support, the Somali community has continued to feel marginalized in terms of 
collective representation and service provision. It has failed to put together a united, 
collaborative Somali voice. In a similar vein, Harris (2004: 6) observes that the large 
number of Somali community groups present at the time of her research had not 
resulted in their representation in local and national bodies concerned with their 
welfare. This sense of marginalization was further echoed in academic work on 
Somalis during this period which, as Kleist (2008b) describes, focused on social 
problems and challenges of living in the West, often portraying Somali migrants as a 
marginalized and struggling community. Policy work on Somalis also followed this 
trend. Often local or regional in focus, much of this work concentrated on housing 
problems, education and training, unemployment, health, substance abuse and so on. 
Emphasizing the obstacles and ‘problems’ faced by Somalis, reinforced the image of 
Somalis as a ‘problem community’ and as ‘passive supplicants of the welfare state’ 
(Harris 2004: 13-14). 
 
Somali Youth: Between development actors and an integrated community  
 
In contrast to the studies above, policy makers, academics and practitioners in the 
development field have begun to stress, in recent years, the importance of the Somali 
diaspora as development actors, and hence as a transnational community oriented 
towards the development of the homeland (Kleist 2008a). Remittances, which are 
primarily sent by the first generation, are often referred to as the ‘lifeline’ of the 
country. They have been central to debates about the Somali diaspora as key agents of 
change. A considerable body of work has demonstrated the importance of diaspora 
contributions – at the level of the ‘household’  – towards humanitarian relief and 
everyday survival and subsistence (Hammond 2013, Lindley 2010).  
 
Increasingly, the younger generation of Somalis abroad have been less engaged in 
sending financial contributions and more concerned with the transfer of knowledge 
and skills through their involvement in the NGO sector and public and private sectors 
in Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland (Hammond et al 2011). Although some young 
people do contribute to family remittances, the money is often administered by older 
family members who make the decisions on when and to whom it is sent. Some of the 
younger people I interviewed emphasized their disconnection from their families 
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‘back home’ and their preference for contributing through personal involvement in 
fundraising initiatives or charitable and development organizations, or by returning to 
the Somali regions to donate time and expertise rather than by handing out cash (see 
Hammond 2011: 40). This generational shift was captured during a discussion with a 
young second generation Somali man who explained, ‘They need our time and 
experience, no longer our wallet!’  
 
This growing involvement of the diaspora in the development-migration nexus (Faist 
2008) is part of a global trend that has seen the emergence of diaspora as agents of 
change in international development thinking. Diasporas have been courted by 
donors, sending states, and NGOs for their financial contributions, and knowledge 
and skill transfers (Turner and Kleist 2013: 192). Policy reports, initiatives and 
academic work on the topic have proliferated. This involvement of African diasporas 
in the development industry has come with a growing interest, throughout the late 
1990s and early 2000s, in new development actors such as traditional authorities, 
churches and migrants. As a result, responsibility for development has become 
increasingly individualized and depoliticized (Turner and Kleist 2013: 200).  
 
Through these forms of engagement, development agencies have shaped diasporas as 
particular types of agents of change. In discussing how European development 
agencies engage and understand the activities of the diaspora, Sinatti and Horst (2014: 
7) argue that the work of diaspora is often seen as ‘charitable’ or ‘philanthropic’, 
small in scale and carried out by volunteers. In addition, the politicized, fragmented, 
and allegedly biased nature of diasporas’ transnational activities is also often targeted 
by European governmental bodies and NGOs (Horst 2013). Diaspora activities are 
juxtaposed with the work of Western development agencies, which are seen to be 
involved in neutral, planned and rational processes. Diaspora organizations are 
therefore targeted by development agencies as needing capacity building in order to 
support them in making activities more ‘professional’ and to incorporate them into the 
development industry (Sinatti and Horst 2014). They are further expected to be 
‘impartial, neutral and unified’ in order to participate in development activities (Horst 
2013: 229).  
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National efforts to engage the Somali diaspora have also been shaped by security 
concerns both in the UK and the Somali regions. In the post 9/11 climate, and 
particularly since the July 2005 bombings, Muslim migrants – including Somalis – 
have been seen through the lens of integration, cohesion and national identity. This 
has led to a greater concern with incorporating migrant groups into counter-terrorism 
and integrationist policies (Lentin and Titley 2011). Somalis have been the target of 
Home Office counterterrorism initiatives such as the Prevent strategy, which is part of 
the CONTEST government counter-terrorism strategy, and has entailed working 
closely with local authorities and community organizations. 
 
Security and development concerns have also shaped the UK’s foreign policy towards 
the Somali regions, and hence its engagement of the Somali diaspora, particularly 
since the establishment of the new federal government of Somalia in 2012, and 
growing stability across the region. Somalia has emerged as a foreign policy priority 
in the UK. The 2012–13 Somalia conferences hosted in London led to renewed efforts 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in engaging the diaspora.  A series 
of diaspora consultations were organized prior to the conferences, involving many of 
the youth groups who I describe in the following section. One of the legacies of this 
consultation was the establishment, within the Somalia Unit, of the first and only 
‘diaspora outreach role’ in the FCO. This unit has been creating a database of 
diaspora groups, meeting with representatives, and financially supporting local 
Somali groups.  Somalis were ‘unwilling migrants’ I was told by one representative, 
‘they didn’t have much of a choice in being here and are waiting to go back “home.”’ 
The comments signal the FCO’s recognition of the transnational engagements of 
Somalis, but also an assumption that a shared ethnicity necessarily entails a desire to 
return and to contribute to the economic, social and political development of the 
country (Sinatti and Horst 2014). Diasporas, given their assumed language skills and 
cultural and contextual knowledge, are also seen as resources or as potential 
mediators between donors, international organizations and governments and the 
Somalia government. 
 
These recent initiatives have meant that Somalis are no longer engaged solely as a 
refugee community, but are incorporated as development agents and active partners in 
national counter-terrorism, integration and foreign policy initiatives. These changes 
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have resulted in the formation of new associations which differ to the refugee 
community organizations of the 1990s and early 2000s. Young people have come to 
imagine themselves as a community of ‘professionals’, emphasizing their Western 
education, engagement with the media, mobility and transnational connections, and 
ability to communicate with host country institutions. They have used this social 
capital to mark a distinction between themselves and their parents’ generation, as well 
as their relatives in the Somali regions. As we shall see below, they have moulded 
themselves around local, national and international notions of the ‘good diaspora’. 
 
THE REMITTANCE CAMPAIGN 
 
Only a few weeks after Barclays’ announcement of its decision to shut down the 
accounts of Dahabshiil and other Somali remittance companies, the news had spread 
among Somalis in the UK, as well as activists and NGOs working in the regions. In 
mid-June a letter signed by over 100 academics and NGOs was drafted, urging the 
government to find a ‘durable solution’ to the problem, and demanding that Barclays 
extend the termination deadline for 6 months. All major news outlets in the UK 
reported on the issue, and quickly the news went viral on social media. The closures 
impacted not only Dahabshiil, but also smaller Somali money service businesses, 
including Mustaqbal, Tawakal and Horyaal.3  
 
Among the first individuals to organize around the issue was a small group in east 
London, some of who were part of the Council of Somali Organizations (CSO) and 
included a mixed group of both older and younger Somalis. Much of the initial 
organizing took place in an office adjacent to the Dahabshiil premises in Tower 
Hamlets, and was organized by the former head of the Somali Money Services 
Association (SOMSA), the recently launched trade association, which at the time was 
led by an individual with close ties to Dahabshiil.4 These initial gatherings brought 
together the directors of various money transfer companies, as well as local Somali 
                                                 
3 The closures posed a major threat to a system considered more cost efficient when compared to large 
remittance companies such as Moneygram and Western Union. Both companies are not well 
represented across the Somali regions and charge considerably more than most Somali MSBs. 
 
4 The Somali Money Services Association (SOMSA) was set in 2012 and is a professional trade 
association representing the Somali Money Services Businesses in the UK.  
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community activists. Amongst the latter were several Somali Labour supporters; two 
planned to stand for the 2014 local council elections.  
 
The Labour party have historically fulfilled a special role in representing minority 
interests in the UK (Statham 1999: 621), and this connection proved to be crucial in 
advancing the campaigners’ ‘political opportunities’. The Labour MP for Bethnal 
Green and Bow, Rushanara Ali, came on board during the early summer months, and 
her office orchestrated a large part of the subsequent campaigning initiatives. In July, 
Ali, along with 47 Labour MPs wrote a letter to Barclays calling for an extension of 
the decision. The Labour connection was key in securing, on the 17th July 2013, one 
of several Parliamentary debates on the issue. Over the summer months, the Tower 
Hamlets Labour Party Office, joined by members of the CSO and several of the 
original organizers, designed a paper petition – entitled Save Remittance Giving – that 
was circulated across the city.  
 
At that stage, among one of the key Somali campaigners to emerge alongside the 
SOMSA representative was Farah Hassan, a young student from a London university 
who was already actively involved in organizing various Somaliland-focused 
initiatives in London. She had been part of the organizing committee for the 
Somaliland independence day celebrations, and was also involved in setting a 
network for young ‘Somaliland professionals’ in the UK . As she explained to me, her 
engagement with Somaliland emerged following a trip in 2010: ‘I realized how things 
were working and how important it was to support it, to contribute… it really opened 
my eyes.’ This experience had shaped her as a ‘nationalist’, she explained, ‘I don’t 
care about clans… I’m interested in Somaliland as a nation. My family don’t 
understand why I am not defending my clan.’  
 
She had joined the campaign in its early stages, concerned that the shut down of the 
remittance accounts would severely affect Somaliland, which unlike South-Central 
Somalia received ‘little backing from the international community’. Throughout the 
campaign she spent the long hot days of Ramadan emailing MPs and local councillors 
about the issue, analysing campaign trends, liaising with the media, and recruiting 
young volunteers to distribute the petition across London and the UK.  
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Within a few months the paper petition merged with the online change.org petition set 
up by Farhan Hassan, the director of the Somali Heritage Academic Network 
(SHAN), a transnational educational research and consultancy organization. The 
organization had been commissioned by the International Organization for Migration 
to conduct a research project on the Somali Diaspora in England and Wales (IOM 
2013), and therefore had previous knowledge of issues relating to diaspora 
engagement, and experience of working with international organizations. Farhan 
initiated the online petition on his own, but within the first few months began working 
closely with the initial group of activists. In August that same year, the petition had 
gathered over 25,500 signatures, and the endorsement of Olympic champion Mo 
Farah. It was delivered to 10 Downing Street by Farah and Farhan, together with 
Rushanara Ali, local labour supporters, a group of NGO workers, and other Somali 
activists. The campaign group also worked closely with NGOs Oxfam and Adeso as 
well as with scholars and academics working on remittance issues. In October, Farhan 
joined by a number of Somali campaigners, alongside staff from Oxfam Great Britain 
mounted a stunt in front of Barclays Bank in Central London.  
 
As the campaign gained momentum, two additional groups joined the campaign: the 
London Somali Youth Forum (LSYF) and the Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM), in 
West and North London respectively. Both organizations had come to the fore in 
recent years, with growing government engagement with the diaspora; they had 
worked closely with the government on its various integration, counter-terrorism, 
foreign policy and diaspora development projects and had taken part in the diaspora 
consultations prior to the 2012–13 conferences.  
 
The director of LSYF, Mohamed Ibrahim, a young man with a background in social 
policy had grown up in Harrow and had previously worked for Hounslow Council. In 
2009 alongside a group of young Somalis in North London he launched LSYF, the 
only Somali- led youth umbrella organization at the time. The group had been 
contacted by the Metropolitan Police and senior government officials concerned with 
the ‘invisibility’ and absence of ‘integration’ and ‘self-representation’ of Somali 
youth in London (Hassan 2014: 111). Following a conference, the forum began 
working to tackle issues such as educational underachievement, anti-social behaviour, 
gang-related crime and extremism (ibid 2014: 112-238), funded by the Trust for 
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London and the PVE programme. As Hassan (2014) has described, these 
engagements with politicians and the police have, on the one hand, enabled the 
growth of organizations such as the LSYF, but on the other hand have proved 
challenging for these groups who have sought to maintain some degree of 
independence, and the trust and involvement of their communities. As Mohamed 
explained to me in an interview, ‘We are involved in PVE but we want to bring our 
own perspective to that… it’s about us telling you what the issues are.’  
 
Adam Matan, a young man who arrived in the UK as a young teenager, following his 
degree founded the second organization, ATM. A transnational youth organization 
created in late 2009 and early 2010 in London, ATM focuses predominantly on 
campaigning against ‘tribalism’ or clan divisions among Somalis. With offices in 
London, Nairobi, Mogadishu and in several US cities, its activities are both local and 
transnational, ranging from fundraising for various charitable projects in Somalia, to 
training young Somalis to become role models in their communities. As Adam 
described, its ultimate aim was to promote ‘Somaliness, a pan-Somali identity’ and to 
‘breakdown what our parents tell us about tribe’, emphasizing its difference to the 
community organizations of the older generations. According to Adam, tribe was 
impeding the prosperity and progress of Somalia. Like LSYF, ATM receives funding 
from local authorities, DfID, the Home Office and FCO. Over the years they have 
worked closely with politicians, including Angie Bray, the former Conservative MP 
for Central Ealing and Acton. ATM has been critiqued for being too closely aligned 
with government, or for being pro-Somalia – a claim that Adam dismissed during our 
discussion by stating, ‘all these political issues, Somalia, Somaliland don’t affect me.’ 
 
Both organizations became involved in the later stages of the campaign. In early 
September 2013, LSYF published a report entitled Putting Lives at Risk, which 
sought to inform a Ministerial meeting, and subsequent roundtable discussion on the 
remittance issue chaired by DfID. Endorsed by 21 Somali organizations in the UK, 
including ATM, the writers of the report presented themselves as ‘representatives of 
the British Somali community.’ Meanwhile ATM had been commissioned by DfID to 
work alongside consultant Beechwood International to conduct a series of community 
consultations which would eventually inform the Safer Corridors Rapid Assessment: 
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Somalia and UK report.5 ATM and LSYF’s involvement in these initial stages 
positioned them as close interlocutors of the government, and, as I describe in a later 
section, they were eventually invited to join as ‘community representatives’ the UK-
Somali Safer Corridor Pilot Project.  
 
On the one hand, the political activities of the campaigners are illustrative of the 
importance of political institutions in providing resources for, and a model of, 
organizing (Ireland 1994). Young Somalis have built organizations that have 
benefited from government policies and funding opportunities around integration, 
security, and foreign development, and in turn this has enabled them to engage 
politically. On the other hand, as Peró (2008) has argued, migrant agency should not 
be ignored when understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of political mobilization, as 
networks and social capital, political socialization, living and working conditions, 
experiences and values also shape the ways in which migrants negotiate institutional 
norms and practices, and mobilize around an issue. As this section has revealed, 
young Somalis were able to network and avail of their social capital not only with 
local Labour political figures, but also with international organizations such as Oxfam 
and Adeso. These transnational ties facilitated their political practices but also 
significantly provided them also with a normative frame of reference in their 
campaign (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 772). As I describe in what follows, the 
campaigners presented themselves through transnational notions of diaspora 
engagement in order to effectively raise awareness of the closures of the remittance 
accounts. 
 
DIASPORA AS SMALL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT ACTORS 
 
In the early stages of the campaign, as part of the Save Remittance Giving campaign, 
the Tower Hamlets Labour Party Office, with the support of various other activists, 
designed a postcard that would circulate with the petition. The postcard invited 
supporters to write to their MPs about the remittance closures. The image on the 
postcard was also reproduced on the online change.org petition. Set on a red 
                                                 
5  The report was hugely controversial and sparked heated debates between a number of Somali 
community and youth groups and the authors of the report. ATM eventually withdrew its support of the 
report. 
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background – the colour of the Labour Party – the leaflet hints at, but makes no direct 
reference, or claims of affiliation, to the party. At the centre of the leaflet is the image 
of a young Somali boy, whose mouth is being held open by an older woman –  
presumably his mother or female relative. A hand comes out of the top left hand 
corner of the image and stands in for the ‘helping hand’ of the diaspora. The 
photograph is taken in a rural setting, and resembles the many sensationalist images 
employed by the media and charitable organizations to attract aid donations. The only 
difference here is that the feeding hand is that of a black (presumably Somali) man or 
woman, as opposed to the helping hand of a white donor. The power inequalities 
between the diaspora and locals reproduce the dichotomies between an affluent 
Westerner and an underdeveloped, vulnerable African – the diaspora present 
themselves as the ‘helping hand’ and the source of financial and humanitarian 
support. The slogan ‘Save Remittance Giving Campaign’, I was told by one of the 
campaigners, was designed to evoke the Muslim notion of sadaqah (voluntary alms) 
and refer to two forms of charitable giving: remittances from the diaspora to relatives 
back home, and the help that UK citizens could give to Somalis by signing the 
petition. The support of the diaspora is presented as a charitable act, and hence as 
small-scale and piecemeal, and directed towards families and local communities.  
 
The message conveyed through the postcard – that remittances are a ‘lifeline’ to the 
region, without which Somalis will plunge into a humanitarian crisis – draws on the 
familiar trope of the diaspora as humanitarian agents. The message was also repeated 
in most of the letters, petitions and other campaign material, and in much of the media 
reporting on the issue. Abdirashid Duale, CEO of the Dahabshiil Group similarly 
echoed these statements in his several public interventions that took place throughout 
2013 and 2014. At an event organized by the Overseas Development Institute in April 
2014 he insisted that the issue was a ‘development one’. ‘It all started with 9/11 with 
increasing regulation. And we are where we are today, where it may be difficult to 
help your family…’ He continued by explaining that the UK government might not 
want to provide more aid, and that remittances constituted one way to allow people to 
help themselves, by setting up businesses, trade, and acting independently. His 
comment reiterated the role of the diaspora as development agents involved in helping 
families and communities ‘back home.’ 
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The campaigners did highlight other detrimental effects of the closures. For example, 
NGOs pointed to their use of remittance accounts to pay their staff and to issue cash 
transfers across the region, and the difficulties they would face with the closures. 
However, the main focus of the campaign remained on the detrimental humanitarian 
consequences of losing diaspora contributions to their families and communities back 
home. My aim in highlighting this element is not to deny that this would have been 
the case should the accounts have been closed, but to highlight the effectiveness of 
this narrative in mobilizing the government. By resonating with mainstream 
understandings of diaspora as humanitarian actors involved in small-scale initiatives, 
these narratives lent persuasiveness and credibility to the campaign.  
 
Presenting the diaspora as agents involved in locally based activities which target 
families, communities, home-towns and regions of origin suggests that the diaspora 
are primarily motivated by kinship, ethnic or national obligations (Sinatti and Horst 
2014: 7). It presumes that ethnic or national belonging of diaspora communities 
necessarily entails a commitment, not only to kin, but to the homeland (Kleist 2013: 
301-302), revealing a ‘sedentary bias’ – an idea that migrants belonging to an ethnic 
group and will eventually return home to their places of origin (Malkki 1992). 
Diaspora engagements are thus cast as ‘natural’, and are thought of in national, and 
ethnic terms (Sinatti and Horst 2014: 9). Whilst this might be true of some Somalis in 
the UK, it does not adequately capture the varied motivations that drove individuals to 
take part in the campaign. It fails to highlight the fact that the diaspora are complexly 
situated actors with a range of economic, political, religious and social interests and 
motivations.  
 
Many of the campaigners did account for their involvement in the campaign as 
motivated by personal concerns for their families and local communities, thus 
fashioning themselves according to mainstream tropes of the diaspora. A young man 
who had worked with ATM and LSYF throughout the campaign explained, ‘First and 
foremost, for me it’s personal, I send money to immediate family… it’s a link back 
home’. Another young person involved stressed that she had joined out of ‘selfish 
reasons… so that my granny can continue to receive our money.’ However, many also 
introduced a range of overlapping explanations. The young man mentioned above 
explained: I’m also Muslim, and for Muslims it’s important to give to those in need... 
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there’s an obligation to contribute.’ Whilst many emphasized the personal dimension 
first, others justified their involvement as a religious obligation, a concern for the state 
(Somalia or Somaliland) as we saw in Farah’s case, or as a universalist concern for 
‘humanity’. As a young man who took part in the initial SOMSA meetings explained, 
‘it’s got to do with humanity first and foremost, a concern with all human kind.’ 
These overlapping, political, religious or humanist explanations were however 
downplayed throughout the campaign in favour of kinship motivations. 
 
Furthermore, diaspora activities were presented as small in scale, carried out by 
volunteers involved in sadaqa (charitable activities) and hence somewhat lacking in 
‘professionalism’ (Sinatti and Horst 2014). Whilst some of the younger campaigners 
sought to challenge these representations, the campaign perpetuated the notion that 
contributions were channelled primarily towards subsistence costs for families. Hence 
diaspora support was presented as driven by a sense of kin obligation not political or 
commercial interests – something I return to in the final sections.  
 
Downplaying other motivations by drawing on these narratives also had another effect 
on the campaign. The slogan ‘let Somalis help themselves’, which was reiterated on 
numerous occasions throughout the campaign, sums up the message of the protestors: 
Somalis were not seeking more help or money from Western governments, they were 
simply asking to be able to continue to support their own families and communities. 
They were presenting themselves as agents involved in an individualized and 
personalized form of development, underlining the role of the diaspora as crucial non-
state development actors. By emphasizing the idiom of self-sufficiency, the 
campaigners positioned themselves both as neoliberal agents, and grassroots activists 
(Lindley 2010: 5). Inserting themselves within these narratives about the diaspora,  
the activists aligned the campaign with mainstream narratives produced by the 
government, NGOs and other development agencies. They crafted an ‘imagined 
community’ based on notions of diaspora and neoliberal development which 
positioned them hierarchically vis-à-vis kin in the Somali regions, and as key actors in 
relation to development agencies and the UK government. 
 




In his work on temporary returnees to Somaliland, Hansen (2013) describes how 
many left the Somali regions before the civil war and have since returned to work in 
the international development sector, presenting themselves as ‘professionals’ and as 
modern political subjects. The notion of ‘professionalism’ emphasizes 'development', 
'modernization’, and 'democratization' and stands in opposition to clan-based politics 
(Hansen 2013). It positions these returnees as distinct from local populations through 
notions of class, status and Western education. This notion of ‘professionalism’, I 
suggest, is similarly employed by young second generation Somalis, who shape 
themselves as ‘good diaspora’ subjects. They do so by reacting to local, national and 
international discourses and policies which position them as fragmented, biased and 
hence lacking in objectivity. The term, therefore, is not employed to refer to 
professionalization as a social process (Escobar 1988), but rather to indicate a term 
used as part of a strategy of self-presentation. Emphasizing professionalism, by 
stressing unity and impartiality, was central to the later stages of the campaign, as the 
young Somali activists introduced above pushed to be recognized as legitimate 
‘community representatives’ in the DfID-led project.  
 
As mentioned above, European relief and development actors often insist that 
diaspora-organized assistance is fragmented and does not adhere to principles of 
impartiality and neutrality (Horst 2013: 229). The fragmented nature of Somalis has 
also long been a concern for the UK government, which has sought to promote and 
encourage unity based on ethnic groupings. As Griffiths et al (2006: 892) note, local 
councils in the UK, influenced by a race relations and multicultural paradigm, have 
been driven by a need to address ‘unified and readily identifiable refugee 
communities’. Government officials often bemoan the fragmented nature of the 
Somali diaspora, and the absence of a single representative for the community. As a  
representative from the Somalia Unit at the FCO commented in an interview ‘Somali 
diaspora groups are really impressive… when they work together that is… which is 
one of the main hurdles of the diaspora’.  
 
Young Somali activists have responded to these narratives about the diaspora by 
stressing their unity and integration in the host society, as well as their impartiality 
and political neutrality in national and international issues. Critiques of clan have 
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played a crucial part in these processes, and also served as a strategy to present 
themselves as distinct to the older generation. As we have seen, Adam Matan 
emphasizes the importance of eradicating clan in order to ‘progress’. Similarly, Farah 
Hassan insists that unlike her family she is disinterested in clan, preferring instead to 
‘contribute’ to the development of the Somaliland nation state. For many young 
people, pan-Somali unity is used primarily to refer to inter-clan unity. These young 
activists shape themselves vis-à-vis the older generation in the UK and the Somali 
regions, for whom, they claim, community work and political activism are divided 
along clan lines.  
 
Although clan divisions are seen as problematic for these young activists, regional 
and political divisions do not necessarily challenge their professionalism or 
objectivity. Hence Farah like many other young people freely emphasized her 
allegiance with Somaliland, whereas other young individuals involved in the 
campaign stressed a Somalia national identity. On the one hand, these young people 
view clan divisions as problematic and draw on a discourse of professionalism, unity 
and impartiality. On the other, they view political divisions as fully compatible with 
this discourse as long as these divisions can be temporarily suspended when 
necessary. 
 
Throughout the campaign, the activists realized the necessity of publicly emphasizing 
community and ethnic unity; in the various petitions, reports and documents emphasis 
was placed on presenting the issue as a ‘community problem.’  As one of the activists 
explained, ‘when we delivered the campaign to 10 Downing street it wouldn’t have 
looked good to just have Rushanara and the remittance companies there. We needed 
to create the sense that this was a community issue, that the community were worried 
about this.’  
 
Putting aside their own political orientations, the campaigners also stressed the 
importance of pan-Somali unity, underlining the way in which the campaign brought 
Somalis together across clans, regional and political divisions. Political and regional 
divisions were temporarily cast aside for the benefit of the campaign. For example, 
criticisms of ATM as supporters of the Mogadishu government, and of CSO as 
Somalilanders, were silenced and many of the activists sought to downplay internal 
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divisions. As a young man noted, ‘what helped with the campaign is that we were all 
on the same level… there were no issues of tribalism, regionalism, we were all a 
mixed group in terms of gender and other things, but we were all young professionals, 
members of civil society who were concerned with a particular issue…’ Whereas the 
older generation are presented by young people as concerned with issues of 
‘tribalism’ and ‘regionalism’, the younger generation, as modern and enlightened 
subjects, present themselves as agents able to privatize and hence transcend these 
divisions. 
 
By emphasizing their unity and professionalism, these young Somalis were drawing 
on a multicultural framework which conflates ethnicity and culture with reified and 
bounded notions of community, and using it as a political resource for their campaign 
(Baumann 1996). They were also reacting to a development discourse which casts the 
diaspora as ‘unprofessional’ and hence legitimizing their position as community 
‘representatives’.  Moreover, by de-emphasizing clan allegiances, and to some extent 
political and regional affiliations, they were presenting themselves as inclusive, 
objective and neutral in their political orientation (Horst 2013). The activists’ 
involvement as ‘community representatives’ in the government Action Group, 
provided further evidence of their impartiality, objectivity and expertise on diaspora 
and community issues, and hence positioned them as ‘good’ national and 
transnational partners.  Yet, their involvement remained constrained within notions of 
‘community’ and, as I elaborate in the final section, by emphasizing their impartiality, 
the activists were also forced to exclude the involvement of Dahabshiil – the largest 
Somali remittance company – from the campaign.  
 
 
THE ISSUE OF BIG BUSINESS 
 
In September 2013, during a DfID roundtable discussion on the remittance crisis, a 
large demonstration took place outside Parliament. Among the many supporters was a 
diverse group of Somalis holding placards stating, for example, ‘Freedom to Support 
our Families’. The event was organized by the chairperson of SOMSA, who, 
alongside local campaigners, had been in charge of sorting out the placards. The 
gathering was unproblematic for most, but a few campaigners complained about the 
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colour of the banners. Whilst the writing on the signs made no mention of Dahabshiil, 
they were printed on light green cardboard, the colour of the company’s logo. 
Similarly to the Labour leaflet mentioned above, the colour was suggestive of the 
association of the campaign with the largest Somali remittance company. 
 
In the initial stages of the campaign, Dahabshiil’s dominance had not been a concern 
for those involved. Representatives from Dahabshiil had been the first to mobilize the 
‘community’, and raise awareness about the issue. Furthermore, the company 
provided essential resources, office space and support throughout these early stages. 
Young volunteers in Tower Hamlets had been asked directly by the Dahabshiil office 
to engage in the campaign. ‘They said they needed people like me to get involved in 
the community’, a young campaigner explained, noting Dahabshiil’s involvement in 
crafting the campaign as a community initiative. 
 
However, as the campaign progressed and other remittance companies began to join, 
Dahabshiil’s dominance was disputed by a small minority of those involved. Some of 
these stressed that the company’s interference contradicted the ‘community’ image of 
the campaign. ‘They used the community to support their aims… they don’t really 
care,’ argued a young man who had become disillusioned with the campaign. 
Resentment also came from other money transfer companies who felt that Dahabshiil 
had become the ‘spokesperson of the campaign’ and was using the issue for 
advertisement purposes. Others worried that Dahabshiil had taken over SOMSA and 
marginalized the other companies. 
 
The most forceful critique, however, came from the government who strongly 
opposed the alliance of community activists with Somali finance capital. In comments 
made in one of the early consultations with the Somali campaigners, and reinforced in 
the Factsheet on Somali Remittances issued in October 2013, the government insisted 
that the closures of the accounts would not cause a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ as the 
campaigners had suggested. It was best to have several small Somali remittance 
companies, rather than a large company that dominated almost three-quarters of the 
market. If small companies closed down, then others would pick up their share of the 
market, and an intervention by the UK government would not be required. 
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Some of the activists present responded forcefully to these claims, arguing that they 
did not want the current system to fail, and did not wish to see Dahabshiil disappear 
from the market. As one of the campaigners explained to me, ‘no one would have 
criticized British people for supporting British Airways, so why can’t we support 
Dahabshiil because it’s a Somali firm?!’ According to government logic, however, if 
the campaign were really about the humanitarian impact of the closures on families 
and communities, then the commercial interests of Dahabshiil ought to be irrelevant 
to the campaigners. Furthermore, if the campaigners insisted on defending the 
company, then they failed to prioritize the interests of the ‘community’. In construing 
themselves as a ‘good diaspora’ – as humanitarian actors and as unified and impartial 
– the activists were being forced to exclude the interests of big businesses from the 
campaign.  
 
The incompatibility of large business interests with this particular notion of the ‘good 
diaspora’ that I have described above needs to be contrasted with the mainstream 
views of the diaspora, and of Dahabshiil, held in the Somali regions and abroad. 
During my interviews with public officials in Somaliland, I was repeatedly told about 
the diaspora’s role in public and private investments in the region. The diaspora were 
spoken about in terms of the skills and capital they brought to the country and were 
often presented as key economic and political players, who contributed to the building 
of the Somaliland nation-state. Reflecting this perspective, the diaspora’s involvement 
in the remittance crisis was often described not as a concern for UK-based activists, 
but as an issue for the private sector, and hence for Dahabshiil and other remittance 
companies abroad. As reflected by the quote comparing British Airways with 
Dahabshiil, several of the campaigners understand the diaspora in these terms, and 
view the Somali remittance businesses are an integral part of the diaspora. 
 
Most Somalis also see remittance companies such as Dahabshiil as an inextricable 
part of the UK community. The LSYF report Putting Lives at Risk, for example, states 
that ‘MSBs are part of us. They are an integral and critical part of our community’.  
Often spoken about as a successful diaspora business story, many see Dahabshiil in 
particular as a ‘home grown’ solution that has been able to thrive despite the conflict 
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and the absence of involvement from the international community (Lindley 2010). 6 
Dahabshiil group is one of the richest companies in the Somali regions, and as 
mentioned earlier, a symbol self-sufficiency, of Somali families ‘helping themselves.’ 
The company is a family business and the CEO, who is based for most of the year in 
London, regularly attends or supports local events and projects organized by Somali 
groups. Many refer to the CEO by name, and individuals, businesses and NGOs that 
use its services often stress their ‘trust’ in the company as a reason for using its 
services. As part of its corporate social responsibility Dahabshiil is also involved in 
various social projects across the Somali regions. Several whom I spoke to in London 
and Somaliland went as far as suggesting that Dahabshiil was ‘a charitable 
organization’ because of these projects, and the access to financial services that they 
provided to the region.  
 
For many Somalis the notion of ‘diaspora’ is more varied and includes investors, 
politicians, entrepreneurs, and professionals. By supporting Dahabshiil’s inclusion, 
the campaigners were initially drawing on this notion, and challenging ideas of the 
‘good diaspora’ held by Western governments and development agencies. As the 
campaign progressed and criticism intensified, however, the ‘community 
representatives’ decided to distance themselves from Dahabshiil and from the money 
transfer sector as a whole. They prioritized the argument around the humanitarian 
impact and the community concerns around the closures, and thus continued to 
perpetuate the notion of the Somali diaspora as a community involved in small-scale 
activities, and as objective and neutral and thus incompatible with large commercial 
interests. In response to growing criticism, Dahabshiil strategically appointed as CEO 
a non-Somali and former CEO of Anglo-Irish Bank, shifting the image of the 





Following the set up of the Action Group for Cross-Border remittances, public attention 
and interest in the campaign slowly waned. Public consultations and engagement events 
were held throughout 2014 to inform Somali communities across the country on the 
                                                 
6 Dahabshiil is the largest remittance company in the region with branches in 126 countries worldwide.  
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work of the Action Group, and over the year the community representatives continued 
to meet informally with more active campaigners to discuss progress on the safer 
corridor project. The design of the Safer Corridor, however, was repeatedly delayed 
and postponed until its official dismantling was announced in late 2015. Since then the 
U.S State department has taken over the management of the Safer Corridor, and the UK 
government strategy has shifted towards the long-term development of financ ia l 
systems in the Somali regions. 
 
Despite this, as I have argued in this article, the campaign marked a key moment among 
Somalis in the UK. It enabled them to fashion and imagine themselves as part of a 
young, unified and integrated community in Britain, and actively and professiona lly 
engaged ‘back home’. It marked the rise of new forms of political mobilization, and the 
emergence of new ‘political entrepreneurs’ who forged and reified an ‘imagined 
community’ based around notions of a ‘good diaspora’. A year later these same key 
individuals and organizations, who had participated in the remittance issue, were 
involved in launching a successful campaign which lobbied the UK government to ban 
the stimulant khat in the UK. The ‘imagined community’, which emerged throughout 
the remittance campaign, proved to be enduring and malleable. While campaigns and 
projects declined, lost momentum or changed focus, the ideas, discourses and 
categories, which were mobilized to construct an imagined community, endured and 
were adapted towards other ends.  
 
Adamson (2012) has argued that, unlike other transnational political activities, 
diasporas seek ‘particularism’ rather than ‘universalism’ even if this often unfolds on 
the basis of a universal ideology such as nationalism. As we have seen, the actors 
involved in the campaign made ‘particularist’ claims, advocating for pan-Somali unity 
among young Somalis in Britain. However, they simultaneously presented themselves 
as global players, and as objective, impartial and transnational ‘professionals’ 
involved in a humanitarian struggle. Their aspirations were at once localized and 
particular as well as globalized and universal. Through the campaign, they challenged 
mainstream ideas of the diaspora as fragmented, biased and politic ized, but also 
reinforced a development framework which juxtaposes the diaspora with western 
development institutions. According to this logic, diasporic subjects are expected to 
‘professionalize’ in order to be incorporated within the policy and development 
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sectors (Sinatti and Horst 2014). Young activists sought to demonstrate the ways in 
which they, unlike the rest of the diaspora, had been able to transform themselves into 
professional actors, and hence deserved to be recognized as ‘representatives’ of their 
community and as stakeholders in the DfID-led Safer Corridor initiative. The ability 
to shape themselves in these ways, I suggest, signals a shift in forms of youth 
mobilization in the UK and positions the young campaigners as new political actors in 
multicultural Britain. In contrast to the older generations, these young activists claim 
to have transformed themselves – in the words of the LSYF director – ‘from hard to 
reach communities, to communities that are asking questions of the government’.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘political entrepreneurs’ involved in the campaign navigated social 
categories of ‘diaspora’ and ‘ethnic migrant community’ that have tended to be treated 
as distinct both in the literature on political mobilization, and in public discourse. The 
FCO representative mentioned above, for example, labelled Somalis as ‘unwilling  
migrants’ who are looking to return ‘home’, suggesting they had never fully settled or 
sought to integrate and belong to Britain. This view is also reflected in the literature s 
on integration and transnationalism. Despite research indicating the compatibility of 
transnational activities and integration (Hammond 2013a), transnational engagements 
are often viewed as a sign that diaspora actors are not integrated, and vice-versa. As the 
campaign demonstrated, it was precisely by fashioning themselves as unified, impartia l 
and integrated in Britain, that the campaigners were able to engage in transnationa l 
activities and present the views of relatives and communities ‘back home’ who would 
be affected by the closures of the accounts. 
 
Yet, the campaign also demonstrated some of the limits of the identity categories 
adopted by those involved. As we have seen, the narratives on diaspora engagement 
assume that the diaspora act as impartial and united community actors involved in 
small-scale, development and community-based activities. By emphasizing these 
elements of diaspora engagement, the campaigners were encouraged to avoid making 
demands that could be deemed to be based on economic interests. Mainstream notions 
of diaspora engagement, I have shown, prioritize certain forms of activities, and do 
not allow sufficient space to account for the complexities of migrants’ lives. They 
ignore the fact that migrants may hold a range of motivations for engaging in issues 
affecting the ‘homeland’, and may be involved in diverse, at times conflicting 
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activities, for example simultaneously supporting families back home, taking part in 
small-scale community initiatives and managing large corporations. 
 
Furthermore, these imagined notions of the ‘good diaspora’ also rely on hierarchies 
across generations and between communities in the UK and the Horn. The young 
campaigners stressed their ‘professionalism’ in relation to both kin ‘back home’ who 
rely on their contributions, and older generations of Somalis, who were presented as 
divided along clan lines and unable to effectively participate in British society. This 
narrative has the effect of downplaying the political activities of the older generation 
and thus potentially delegitimizing their political claims. ‘Imagined communities’, this 
article has shown, are forged by engaging with local, national and transnationa l 
discourses, but also involve re-imagining one’s own community in relation to multip le 
others, including, in this case, older generations of Somalis, and kin ‘back home’. These 
constructions are at once empowering and enabling, as demonstrated by the campaign, 
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